Political attractiveness of multiparty and one-party presidential cabinets: A comparative analysis of Brazil, Chile, Guatemala, and Mexico*

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Abstract
By the time this research was conducted, Brazil, Chile, Guatemala, and Mexico had all of them fragmented legislatures; while the former two had multiparty presidential cabinets, the latter two had the one-party kind. This difference concerning cabinets partisan composition leads to the question: Why some presidents share their cabinets with coalition parties while others do not? In order to answer such a question, I will conduct a descriptive comparative analysis of these four presidential cabinets assessing the political attractiveness of their ministries. Variables concerning budget capacities, networking capacities, tenure length, patronage capacities, and normative capacities will be considered for the year of 2011. It is expected that cabinets concentrating considerable amounts of the just mentioned capacities are more desirable and attractive for coalition parties to control, leading the president to create a government coalition through cabinet sharing. Consequently, countries where ministries are well endowed of such variables, like Chile and Brazil, tend to have multiparty cabinets; while countries where ministries are not well endowed of such capacities, like Guatemala and Mexico, tend to have one-party cabinets because coalition parties do not see any advantage in controlling ministries.

Key-words: Presidential cabinets, political attractiveness, comparative analysis, Latin America

Jel Classification: H10, H50, H60

Resumen
Al momento de realizarse esta investigación, los legisladores de los congresos de Brasil, Chile, Guatemala y México se encontraban fragmentados; mientras que los dos primeros contenían gabinetes presidenciales multipartidistas, los dos últimos tenían más bien el tipo de partido único. Esta diferencia plasmada en la composición partidista de los gabinetes conlleva a la pregunta: ¿por qué algunos presidentes comparten sus gabinetes con partidos de coalición y otros no? Para responder a esta pregunta, se llevó a cabo un análisis comparativo descriptivo de estos gabinetes presidenciales evaluando el atractivo político de sus ministerios. Las variables que se analizan se asocian con las capacidades presupuestarias, las capacidades de red, la duración de la posesión, las capacidades patronales y las capacidades normativas en el año 2011. Se esperaría que los gabinetes que protagonizan significativamente dichas capacidades serían lo más deseable y atractivo para el control de los partidos de la coalición liderando al presidente para crear una coalición de gobierno a través del gabinete compartido. En consecuencia, los países donde los ministerios están mejor dotados de tales capacidades, como Chile y Brasil, tienden a tener gabinetes multipartidistas; mientras que los países donde los ministerios no están bien dotados de tales capacidades, como Guatemala y México, tienden a tener gabinetes de un solo partido porque los partidos de la coalición no ven ninguna ventaja en el control de los ministerios.

Palabras Clave: Gabinetes presidenciales, atractividad política, análisis comparativo, América Latina

Clasificación JEL: H10, H50, H60.

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Introduction

Many things have been said about the political systems chosen by Latin American countries in their last wave of democratization; the choice towards presidential systems is evident. About such an evident but not flawless choice, questions have been arising regarding its odds of success or failure. Contrary to the pessimistic conclusions of a broad literature composed by: Linz (1973 and 1990), Mainwaring (1991 and 1997), Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán (1997), Stepan and Skach (1993), Ames (2002a and 2002b), Shugart and Carey (1992), Carey and Shugart (1995), and Shugart and Mainwaring (1997), a good level of government stability has been observed during almost 25 years in the region.

One of the reasons why such a stability could be observed in many countries rely on the choice of presidents to build government coalitions. Chasquetti (2001) states that in occasions where presidents hold fixed terms and fragmented legislatives are the norm, the creation of government coalitions are mandatory. Foweraker (1998) states that countries in which presidents managed to create majority coalitions within legislatives (like in Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Uruguay) faced higher levels of governability and political stability than those countries in which presidents did not created government coalitions, remaining minority (like in Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela).

Once coalitions are formed, according to Raile, Pereira, and Power (2011) and Chaisty, Cheesman, and Power (2014), presidents must pick a coalition management tool in a toolbox composed of constitutional powers, cabinet management, partisan institutional powers, deliverance of resources for pork barreling, informal institutions, etc. in order to manage their coalitions. The effective use of these coalition management tools has been allowing presidents to successfully negotiate with a significant number of coalition parties inside the legislative.1

Among all those tools, Cox and Morgenstern (2001) show that it is evident the use of cabinet management by presidents in exchange of political support in many Latin American countries. According to Figueiredo, Canello, and Vieira (2012), between 1979 and 2011, fourteen countries in Latin America had three percent of supermajority unitary cabinets, seven percent of majority unitary cabinets, eight percent of majority coalitions, 17 percent of minority unitary ones, 30 percent of minority coalitions and 36 percent of supermajority coalitions. However, a few countries with fragmented legislatives and minority presidents did not have multiparty cabinets. In such a case, it can be supposed that presidents make a choice towards another coalition management tool instead of cabinet management. Another explanation for the existence of one-party cabinets might be the fact that it is not a good deal for coalition parties to be part of the cabinet because the ministries composing it do not have any political attractiveness at all.

Based on that, one could ask if the parties belonging to the ruling coalition are indifferent among all ministries inside the cabinet; or even deeper, the question could be: Why are political parties even interested in holding cabinet positions? Supposing that coalition parties are interested in resources to keep their power and influence, cabinets well endowed of some special characteristics, which can help these parties to achieve good levels of power and influence, would be more interesting than cabinets without these special characteristics. In other words, a cabinet with higher levels of: Budget capacities, networking capacities, tenure length, patronage capacities, and normative capacities would increase the power and influence of a coalition party holding the control of a ministry within this cabinet; consequently, being

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1 It's important to note that despite the current crisis in Brazil, their conclusions stand still as long as, one of the main reasons for the current Brazilian political turmoil since 2014 is the absence of a good use of those tools by former President Rousseff and her closest political advisors.

2 I am defining ministries all those government agencies closely related to presidents. So, in Mexico they are called for example as Secretarias just like some of them in Brazil.
more interesting for coalition parties to hold a position inside this cabinet making it to be defined as a multiparty kind.

I will analyze in a descriptive and comparative way the presidential cabinets of four Latin American countries in 2011, namely Brazil, Chile, Guatemala, and Mexico; ranking the ministries in each country according to their capacity levels; and, showing how presidents share their cabinet top positions with coalition parties.

By doing so, I introduce new concepts and details into cabinet analysis, providing new connections among already known concepts. Also, I expect this contribution to help in the advancement of the knowledge in the field.

Literature review

In the following two sub-sections I present the literature about coalition management in Brazil, Chile, Guatemala, and Mexico in order to show how their presidents made use of the toolbox available to them.

Multiparty cabinets and minority presidents: Brazil and Chile

In several Latin American countries, including Brazil, 67 percent of minority presidents used cabinet management to achieve a majority of seats within congress. High transactional costs make impossible day-by-day ad hoc negotiations with representatives in many cases being more appropriate for the president the use of stable government coalitions through cabinet appointment. (Figueiredo, Salles, and Vieira 2010, Arretche and Rodden 2004).

Analysis about Brazil comparing the 1946-1964 period and the post-1985 period concluded that distinctive features are responsible for diverse kinds of cabinets. Party indiscipline and legislative fragmentation tend to create coalitional cabinets (those based on party criteria) while the high constitutional powers of presidents create cooption cabinets (ministers with party ties but not acting as a party agent inside the cabinet). In both periods, the bigger the share of the cabinet offered to coalition parties; the bigger the legislative discipline obtained. On top of that, it also can be seen that the number of senators and representatives appointed as a minister is considerable in Brazil (Amorim Neta 1994, Amorim Neto and Santos 2001, Amorim Neto, Cox, and McCubbins 2003, Figueiredo, 2007).

Empirically it is showed that coalescence (the proportion between the number of ministries controlled by a coalition party and the number of seats this same party has inside the House) and legislative discipline have a positive relationship (Amorim Neto 2000 and 2002, Amorim Neto and Tafner 2002, Amorim Neto, Cox, and McCubbins 2003).

The literature which discuss the Brazil’s case, besides cabinet management, its presidents use other tools to get support from House representatives. Those tools are referred as: i) Budget amendments delivered by the executive to representatives to engage in pork barrel politics; ii) influence of the executive over party leaders inside the House to whip representatives; and, iii) the constitutional powers granted to the executive (Pereira and Rennó 2001 and 2003, Pereira and Mueller 2003, Limongi and Figueiredo 1995, Figueiredo and Limongi 1999, Melo 2009).

Regarding Chile, its president is considered one of the most powerful in constitutional terms in the region. In Carey’s (2002), Londregan’s (2002), and Huneeus’ (2005) opinion, Nevertheless, even with all this strength, many studies depict the Chilean congress as a not subservient actor (Alemán and Navia 2009, Siavelis, 1997 and 2002).
some can see a disciplined Chilean legislative because of its high ideology cohesion. Calvert (2004) says that legislative discipline in Chile is also achieved because of the strong powers held by party leaders to whip their caucuses.

About cabinet management, even being illegal in Chile, one can see the appointment of representatives’ appointees for jobs in the federal executive bureaucracy. The appointees who get these jobs would act as informants to representatives about the steps taken by presidents and their ministers. (Ferraro, 2008). To avoid some party of taking control of an entire ministry (making of it some sort of party agency), the minister and the vice-minister are forbidden to be party fellows. According Dávila (2011) and Dávila, Olivares Lavado, and Avedaño (2013), the percentage of ministers without any kind of current party affiliation is not so high; and even the few technocrats found have some kind of partisan activity in their past. Only 6.7 percent of all ministers belonging to any of the four governments terms after Pinochet had none political linkage whatsoever. The Finance Ministry is the one with the highest number of technocrats, having only one minister with some sort of political ties. Avendaño and Dávila (2012) carried out an analysis about job turnover among ministers and concluded that it does not lead to political instability in Chile; on the contrary, high ministerial turnover creates political stability because it gives opportunity for the fulfillment of coalition parties demands.

Summing up, Nolte (2003) points out as essential for the success of Chilean multiparty presidentialism the following: i) The change of electoral agreements in to government agreements and coalitions; ii) cabinet management; iii) the good relationship between representatives who belong to the same coalition; iv) the impossibility of the minister and the vice-minister from a same ministry being affiliated to the same party; and v) the role played by the Presidency Secretary as coordinator between the executive and legislative.

One-party cabinets and minority presidents: Guatemala and Mexico

Unfortunately, the literature regarding Guatemala is not as vast as the ones regarding Brazil, Chile, and Mexico, implying that the literature review about the way Guatemalan presidents deal with the legislative will not be as detailed as the ones about how Brazilian, Chilean, and Mexican presidents deal with their legislatives.

After a violent electoral campaign (56 people with political connections were murdered), Álvaro Cólom (Hope National Unity Party – UNE) was elected as president of Guatemala in 2008 beating other 13 candidates with fifteen parties offering candidates in the legislative elections.

Guatemalan parties have a low level of ideology, which is why elections run around candidates instead of parties (Azpuru 2005 and 2008). Usually, parties start to fragment in a brief period following the elections because of the lack of organizational institutionalization, disappearing and inducing politicians to get another political affiliation afterwards. (Azpuru 2008 and 2009).

Thanks to this low level of organizational institutionalization, Guatemalan presidents who are the strongest political agents and the most recognizable to the constituency in the country, besides relying on their constitutional powers and personal image to deal with the legislative, also affect House day-by-day activities by influencing in the distribution of standing committees seats using it as coalition management tool by informally appointing representatives to these committees according to the share of seats each party had within the legislative. Meanwhile, the legislative by its turn, thanks to the low levels of party cohesion and ideology and the high levels of party switching, do not use its watchdog prerogatives against the president (Azpuru and Blanco 2008, Briscoe 2007, Center for Systemic Peace 2011).
Regarding Mexico, constitutionally speaking, its presidents are among the constitutionally weakest in Latin America. Despite such a constitutional weakness, some former facts within Mexican political legal framework allowed Mexican presidents to achieve reasonable levels of governability in the past. They were: i) The high levels of party discipline observed, a by-product of a centralized party control, which in its turn was a by-product of older times when the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) iron-fist ruled both, the executive and the legislative; ii) the fact that the nation’s president and the party’s holding the presidency president were the same person; iii) the presence of a unitary government understood as the situation in which the same party controls the presidency and the legislative; and, iv) forbidden re-elections, which delivered to presidents great bargain powers over representatives, who, by knowing that after their terms would have to rely on party stalwarts like the president to get some job inside the federal or party bureaucracy. (Casar 1999 and 2002, Nacif 2002, Weldon 1997 and 2002).

For Mexican presidents misfortune, none of those four facts are observed anymore. In 1996, PRI gave up its control over electoral surveillance procedures to a neutral institution, the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE)4, believing that it would not affect the party future electoral outcomes. However, in 1997, after 68 years of dominance, that did not hold true and PRI lost its majority within the legislative. According to Diaz (2004), this new electoral competition made PRI members not to fear anymore their national partisan leaders. This new confidence of PRI members led to a never seen before levels of partisan indiscipline. This never seen before levels of indiscipline commanded PRI national leadership to adopt a fresh strategy to get back adequate levels of discipline by granting organizational powers to regional party leaders to appoint candidates and party affiliates for jobs inside the bureaucracy (a prerogative that until then belonged exclusively to the national party leaders). Another fundamental characteristic mentioned, namely the fact that the nation’s president and the party’s holding the presidency president were the same person, was not observed during Vicente Fox (2000-2006), Felipe Calderón (2006-2012), and the current incumbent Enrique Peña Nieto (2012-2018) presidential terms. Finally, also harming Mexican presidents governability capacity, the reelections for the legislative were allowed in 2014, reducing presidents bargain power over representatives.

According to Nacif (2004) and Casar (2002), in this new scenario Mexican presidents have now a lower profile position in their relationship with the legislative, leading to a decrease in the number of bills sent by presidents to the legislative and the increasing need for frequent negotiation between them, their parties, and representatives from other parties as well.

Circumventing the problems created by the end of the presidential special prerogatives, the 1997-2000 period is characterized by a new pattern comprised by several coalitions, being the most remarkable ones some unthinkable until then joint votes of PAN (National Action Party) and PRI. This PAN support in these roll calls, may be explained because of PAN representatives’ ideological alignment to the bills posed by the president and because of the considerable amount of money from the federal budget that was delivered to cities governed by PAN mayors (Lujambio 2001).

Calderón faced lower levels of political turmoil with the legislative during his term than his predecessor Fox did, except for a few troubles with Democratic Party of the Revolution (PRD) politicians (Magar and Romero 2008). This bonanza Calderon faced came from: i) His good levels of popularity among citizens; ii) his good relationship with PAN fellows, especially when compared with Fox’s who strongly underrepresented PAN in his cabinet; and iii) a shift in PRI legislative strategies concerning presidents’ agenda (during Vicente Fox’s term, PRI performed the strongest possible opposition to the president’s bills. This behavior led PRI to a shameful third place on the upcoming presidential race, making it to reconsider this

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4 In 2014, the IFE became the National Electoral Institute.
oppositional strategy, realizing that a more collaborative behavior with PAN’s representatives during Calderón term could result in better outcomes) (Samuels and Shugart 2010).

**Empirical analysis**

Brazil, Chile, Guatemala, and Mexico are the countries selected. All of them had fragmented legislatures, but two had multiparty cabinets (Brazil and Chile) while the other two had one-party cabinets (Guatemala and Mexico). In addition to that, these four countries were also picked based on the high effectiveness of their laws of transparency, which disclosed all the detailed information needed. Some of the basic features of them are in Table 1 below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Constituency</th>
<th>GDP per capita (USD)</th>
<th>Electoral system to the House</th>
<th>Effective number of parties</th>
<th>President’s party House share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>190,732,694</td>
<td>135,804,433</td>
<td>10,978</td>
<td>OLPR</td>
<td>10.42</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>17,308,449</td>
<td>8,285,186</td>
<td>12,682</td>
<td>Binomial</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>14.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>14,706,578</td>
<td>5,990,029</td>
<td>2,882</td>
<td>CLPR</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>32.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>112,336,538</td>
<td>77,815,606</td>
<td>8,921</td>
<td>CLPR and relative majority</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>28.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Source: Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE), Datosmacro, Chilean National Institute of Statistics (INEGI), Brazilian Supreme Electoral Court (TSE), TCEC, Mexican National Electoral Institute (INE), World Bank, Political Database of the Americas, houses of representatives and federal executive governments of Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Guatemala, 2014.

Table 1 brings together two nations with big constituencies and two with small constituencies. Excepting Guatemala, the economic performances are also quite similar. On top of that, all four presidents were minority ones implying that some sort of coalition management tool must be used by these presidents to achieve reasonable levels of legislative agenda approval. The variables selected to represent the political attractiveness of cabinets, which are assumed to have a positive impact on their levels of political attractiveness are:

- **Budget capacity**
  - Budget: the share of the whole cabinet budget in relation to the country GDP in 2011;
  - Unrestricted expenses: ministries average share of discretionary spending in relation to their budgets in 2011.

- **Networking capacity**
  - Networking: ministries average number of agencies, companies, and so on directly linked to them in 2011.

- **Tenure length**
  - Tenure: ministers’ average tenure in months from 1990 until 2014.

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5 It cannot be ignored the fact that Mexican and Guatemalan presidents had a bigger share of congressional seats than Brazilian and Chilean had. But even with this difference, it is expected that with a share around 30 percent of the total seats, those presidents could not govern without the support of other parties as long as they remained minority ones.
• **Patronage capacity**
  Patronage: ministries average share of temporary employees and political appointees in relation to their total number of employees in 2011.

• **Normative capacity**
  Normative: ministries average number of acts and normative procedures signed by their ministers in 2011.

Regarding the importance of each one of these capacities, Mauerberg et al. (2016) through an elite survey conducted with Brazilian House stalwarts found out that budgetary capacities are highly regarded by politicians; with the total budget being more attractive to them than the unrestricted expenses. Another very important capacity is the normative one, with House stalwarts showing great interest in the possibility of ruling a sector of the economy or social life. The networking capacity came next, followed by the tenure length. Lastly came the patronage capacities.

*Cabinet political attractiveness in Brazil and Chile*

Brazil and Chile had in 2011 each 38 and 20 ministries respectively. The values for each one of the capacities measuring the political attractiveness for both countries are depicted in Graph 1 below.

**Graph 1 – Average values of political attractiveness for Brazil and Chile - 2011**

![Graph 1](image_url)

Note: Normative was multiplied by 1/100 to fit in the graph scale

The graph shows that both multiparty cabinet countries have a considerable amount of their GDPs spent by their ministries: 18.84 percent in Brazil and 20.98 percent in Chile. The unrestricted expenses comprise 6.90 percent of ministries average budget in the Brazilian case and 26.96 percent in the Chilean one.

The number of agencies and companies linked on average to each ministry is no more than seven in both countries, which can be interpreted as a reasonable level of influence of the ministry beyond its own boundaries.

In both cases, since 1990 the ministers were in office on average for more than 20 months, which shows that when politicians from some party get a ministry, they will have a reasonable amount of time to implement their policies and political strategies.
The difference between Brazil and Chile regarding the variable Patronage (employees with *cargos de confiança* in Brazil and those *a contracta* in Chile) is outstanding and expected. This difference is the result of the way the data are disclosed by these countries. The Brazilian database distinguishes between the life-tenured professionals (those whom the minister has no influence whatsoever), the outsourced ones (those coming from some private company to perform a specific job), and the *cargos de confiança* (those selected directly by ministers according to their personal and political preferences. These are the ones depicted in Chart One). On the other side, the Chilean database does not offer the same level of details when compared to Brazil; distinguishing on one hand the life-tenured professionals and on the other hand the outsourced ones plus the political appointees who are all called *a contracta*. But, despite that, the proportion in both countries of this kind of employees is not negligible.

Finally, regarding normative power, Brazilian ministers issued in 2011 an average of 1700 acts while each minister from Chile issued in the same year an average of 2360 acts. Considering these numbers and assuming that signed acts interfere over some policy area, ministers from both countries hold considerable normative power.

Starting the discussion about other objectives of the paper, looking at each ministry list of capacities from each country, by ordering the three top-ranked ministries regarding each variable of political attractiveness, the first conclusion reached is that, never a top-three in total budget appeared also in a top position regarding unrestricted expenses.

Showing how cabinet top positions according to the capacities are ranked, one can see that, in Brazil, from all 38 ministries, four of them appeared twice in the ranking files. The Ministry for Defense, the Ministry for the Justice, the General Secretary of the Presidency, and the Secretary for Human Rights, while in Chile this pattern is more common since the size of the Chilean cabinet is much smaller than the Brazilian one. All this previous information is in the following Table 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Budget</th>
<th>Unrestricted expenses</th>
<th>Networking</th>
<th>Tenure</th>
<th>Patronage</th>
<th>Normative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Social Security</td>
<td>Labor</td>
<td>Health</td>
<td>National Integration</td>
<td>Human Rights</td>
<td>Women’s Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Labor and Social Security</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Health</td>
<td>Public Works</td>
<td>Housing and Urban Planning</td>
<td>Interior and Public Safety</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Analyzing how Brazilian and Chilean presidents shared their cabinet top positions with coalition parties, Table 3, which uses the same ranking posed in Table 2, but changing the
names of the ministries by the acronym of the party controlling each of them in 2011 reveals the great amount of ministries controlled by Brazilian then president Dilma Rousseff’s own party (Workers’ Party – PT); while in president Sebastián Piñera’s cabinet (National Renewal Party – RN) there was a predominance of expert ministers.

### Table 3. Party affiliation of ministers controlling cabinet top positions – Brazil and Chile – 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Budget</th>
<th>Unrestricted expenses</th>
<th>Networking</th>
<th>Tenure</th>
<th>Patronage</th>
<th>Normative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>PMDB</td>
<td>PSB</td>
<td>PT</td>
<td>Expert</td>
<td>Expert</td>
<td>PT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PDT</td>
<td>PT</td>
<td>PMDB</td>
<td>PT</td>
<td>PT</td>
<td>PT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PT</td>
<td>PT</td>
<td>PT</td>
<td>PT</td>
<td>PT</td>
<td>PMDB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Expert</td>
<td>Expert</td>
<td>Expert</td>
<td>Expert</td>
<td>UDI</td>
<td>RN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UDI</td>
<td>UDI</td>
<td>Expert</td>
<td>Expert</td>
<td>Expert</td>
<td>Expert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Expert</td>
<td>Expert/ Expert</td>
<td>UDI</td>
<td>Expert</td>
<td>UDI</td>
<td>UDI</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement- PMDB, Democratic Labor Party – PDT, Brazilian Socialist Party – PSB, and Independent Democratic Union. – UDI.


The fact that PT did not share the best ministries with most of other coalition parties, allied to the lack of confidence between Mrs. Rousseff and her closest political advisors with party leaders inside the House can give some clue toward a better understanding of the dissatisfaction of House representatives towards her. According to Folha de São Paulo (2013) the support for the executive inside the House in her term showed its lowest levels since 1989. Also, this can be a hint of why so many representatives voted to impeach her in 2016.

### Cabinet political attractiveness in Guatemala and Mexico

With a smaller size, both countries with one-party cabinets had in 2011 nine ministries (Guatemala) and 19 (Mexico). All their variables of political attractiveness are depicted in the following Graph 2.

### Graph 2 – Average values of political attractiveness for Guatemala and Mexico - 2011

Note. Missing values for Guatemalan Education and Defense ministries.
Normative was multiplied by 1/100 to fit in the graph scale.
Source: Open Wolf and Informex, 2014.
Their size of total budget as a proportion of the GDP is much smaller when compared with the multiparty case: 5.04 percent in Guatemala and 6.26 percent in Mexico. Nevertheless, ministers’ ability to spend their budget with discretion (Unrestricted expenses) in Guatemala is quite like Chile and even bigger than in Brazil. Despite that, this evidence must be carefully interpreted because, if the total budget is smaller, than the total money available for unrestricted expenses even being the percentage similar, will also be smaller in absolute terms.

The average number of linked agencies and companies is similar to Brazil and Chile in the case of Guatemala but bigger in Mexico; which can be interpreted as a greater ministry spillover effect for Mexican ministers.

Not so different from the multiparty case, the Guatemalan tenure lies in the interval between 20 and 30 months while the Mexican is around 35 months on average.

The discretion to hire employees (Patronage) if compared to the multiparty cabinets analyzed is smaller only in Mexico.

Besides the Budget capacity difference between the cases, another advantage is seen towards the multiparty cabinets over one-party cabinets regarding the Normative capacity, in which an average of only 729 acts were signed by each Guatemalan minister in 2011 and only 37 by each Mexican minister on average.

By ranking the top positions to check the ministries distribution inside the one-party cabinets, because they are smaller in Guatemala and Mexico than in Chile, and especially in Brazil, it would be expected many ministries showing up in more than one capacity, which happens indeed. Party analysis here does not apply since the Guatemalan and Mexican cabinets are one-party characterized.

### Table 4 - Ranking of ministries according to political attractiveness levels – Guatemala and Mexico – 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Budget</th>
<th>Unrestricted expenses</th>
<th>Networking</th>
<th>Tenure</th>
<th>Patronage</th>
<th>Normative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>Communication, Infrastructure, and Housing</td>
<td>Environment and Natural Resources</td>
<td>Culture and Sports</td>
<td>Labor and Social Welfare</td>
<td>Communication, Infrastructure, and Housing</td>
<td>Chief of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Health and Social Services</td>
<td>Energy and Mines</td>
<td>Communication, Infrastructure, and Housing</td>
<td>Public Health and Social Services</td>
<td>Culture and Sports</td>
<td>Environment and Natural Resources</td>
<td>Environment and Natural Resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief of Staff</td>
<td>Culture and Sports</td>
<td>Chief of Staff</td>
<td>Culture and Sports</td>
<td>Environment and Natural Resources</td>
<td>Environment and Natural Resources</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Public Education</td>
<td>Communication and Transportation</td>
<td>Health</td>
<td>Defense</td>
<td>Public Functions</td>
<td>Social Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>Communication and Social Resources</td>
<td>Environment and Natural Resources</td>
<td>Chief of Staff</td>
<td>Health</td>
<td>Energy</td>
<td>Economy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Open Wolf and Infomex 2014.
Discussion

Coming back to the introduction, when I expected that presidential cabinets better endowed of budget capacities, networking capacities, tenure length, patronage capacities, and normative capacities are more attractive for coalition parties to join, the numbers do not show a clear difference regarding networking capacities, tenure length, and patronage capacities between multiparty cabinets and one-party cabinets. Meanwhile, the analysis conducted shows a consistent difference between multi and one-party cabinets concerning their budget capacities and normative capacities.

The data presented here showed that concerning only Brazil, Chile, Guatemala, and Mexico in 2011, the Brazilian and Chilean cabinets are indeed better endowed of budget capacities and normative capacities; which by their turn, according to Mauerberg et al. (2016) are regarded as the most important capacities in politicians’ preferences.

Based on that, and on the literature review, because the Brazilian and Chilean cabinets are more politically attractive than the Guatemalan and Mexican ones they might be drawing the attention of coalition parties to appoint party members as ministers leading presidents in these countries to choose cabinet management as one of the coalition tools at their disposal, making these cabinets to be characterized as multiparty cabinets instead of one-party cabinets.

Conclusions

This paper carried out a comparative analysis among four presidential Latin American countries and their cabinets in 2011: Brazil, Chile, Guatemala, and Mexico.

Based on the assumption that all four minority presidents have more than one coalition management tool at their disposal to achieve reasonable levels of governability, the literature review showed the tools picked by each one of their presidents. In Brazil, the literature states as chosen tools cabinet management, use of institutions, and resources for pork barrel. In Chile, besides the help of a high ideology cohesion, presidents also use cabinet management to get support from the legislative. The sparse literature regarding Guatemala showed that its presidents rely mainly on their constitutional powers and personal image to deal with a fragmented and not cohesive legislative. Finally, Mexican presidents, with the end of their powers derived from party strengths, had to learn how to make ad hoc negotiations with oppositional parties, delivering resources for pork, also counting on strategy mistakes made by other parties.

It was expected that presidential cabinets better endowed of budget capacities, networking capacities, tenure length, patronage capacities, and normative capacities were more attractive for coalition parties to join; suggesting that well-endowed cabinets draw the attention of these coalition parties to control ministries within them, leading presidents to choose cabinet management as one of the governability tools at their disposal, being characterized as multiparty ones. Overall, the variables showed that the two multiparty cabinets analyzed in 2011 are indeed better endowed, offering some sort of support for what was previously expected.
References


